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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires that we apply the zone of danger 
test recently announced in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 
114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994) to a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  The claim was brought by plaintiff Jerold E. 
Bloom, a railroad employee, against his employer Consolidated 
Rail Corporation ("Conrail") under the Federal Employer's 
Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1986), and 
resulted in a large judgment in his favor against Conrail.  
Bloom's injuries were caused by the emotional stress that he 
suffered after a locomotive engine he was operating struck and 
killed a pedestrian.  Because under Gottshall the judgment cannot 
stand, we reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment 
for Conrail. 
 
  I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Bloom was employed by Conrail as a locomotive engineer 
beginning in 1976.  During his employment at Conrail, two of his 
trains were involved in fatalities.  The first fatality occurred 
in the spring of 1986, when Bloom's engine struck a car and 
killed the driver.  Following this fatality, Conrail allowed 
Bloom to return to work.  Medical treatment was available through 
the health plan, though Conrail did not require psychiatric 
  
desensitization1 or any other kind of treatment, and Bloom did 
not seek any.  The second fatality occurred on October 28, 1986, 
when Bloom's locomotive struck and killed a pedestrian who 
stepped on the tracks to commit suicide.  Even though Bloom felt 
faint, lightheaded, and nauseous, a Conrail patrolman required 
him to exit the train and verify the point of contact, which was 
to Bloom, at that point, a gruesome exercise.  Following the 
second fatality, Bloom sought and received psychiatric treatment 
covered under the health plan, and underwent extensive counseling 
for post traumatic stress disorder and chronic phobia syndrome.  
He was never able to resume railroad work. 
 Bloom brought this FELA action for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Conrail twice moved for summary 
judgment on grounds that Bloom's claim was not actionable under 
FELA.  The district court denied the motions.  At trial, after 
the presentation of plaintiff's case, Conrail moved for judgment 
as a matter of law on the grounds that Bloom's claim was not 
actionable and that there was insufficient evidence of causation.  
The motion was denied.  The jury determined that Bloom suffered 
$425,000 total damages, of which thirty percent was caused by 
Conrail's negligence and seventy percent was caused by the 
suicidal pedestrian.  The district court entered a $425,000 
                     
1
.  One trauma, even if it fails to cause a severe reaction, 
apparently may sensitize a person to subsequent traumas.  During 
psychiatric desensitization treatment, doctors attempt to reduce 
a patient's propensity for a sensitized future response to trauma 
via counseling and medication. 
  
judgment for Bloom, reasoning that 45 U.S.C. § 51 holds carriers 
liable for injuries resulting "in whole or in part" from their 
negligence.  Conrail filed post-trial motions requesting judgment 
as a matter of law or, alternatively, to amend the judgment to 
limit damages.  The district court sua sponte dismissed the 
motions for lack of prosecution.  
 On this appeal Conrail has argued that the district 
court erred in not granting judgment as a matter of law because 
Bloom's claim is not actionable under FELA in light of Gottshall 
(which was decided after the appellate briefs were filed),2 and 
because there was no evidence that Conrail caused Bloom's injury.  
Conrail also assigns error in the district court's refusal to 
apportion damages according to the jury's determination, and 
contends that the district court abused its discretion by sua 
sponte dismissing Conrail's post-trial motions.  Bloom counters 
each of these contentions, and also responds that if Bloom's 
claim is not actionable on the present record under Gottshall, we 
should remand for further factual findings.3  We limit our 
                     
2
.  We held the case c.a.v. pending the Supreme Court's 
disposition of Gottshall. 
3
.  On appeal, Bloom has also contended that Conrail's appeal is 
not properly before this court because Conrail did not timely 
file its notice of appeal.  We find Bloom's appellate 
jurisdiction arguments plainly without merit.  Bloom submits that 
Conrail's appeal is not timely because:  (1) under Rule 4(a)(1) 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP"), Conrail's 
notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the 
district court entered judgment in favor of Bloom and (2) FRAP 
4(a)(4) does not apply because Conrail's post-trial motions were 
not "timely" since they were dismissed for lack of prosecution 
under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e).   
  
discussion to the dispositive question whether Bloom's FELA claim 
is actionable in the wake of Gottshall.  This is a question of 
law and our review is plenary.   
  
 II.  IS BLOOM'S CLAIM ACTIONABLE UNDER FELA? 
 A.   Gottshall 
 The Gottshall opinion dealt with two cases, both 
emanating from this court, Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993) and Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Like Bloom, James Gottshall was an employee of Conrail.  
Gottshall was a track repairman who was assigned along with his 
co-workers the task of replacing a stretch of defective track on 
an extremely hot and humid afternoon.  During that afternoon 
Conrail drove the men to complete their task at an unusually fast 
pace and, although water was available, repeatedly discouraged 
breaks.  Under these conditions, Gottshall's longtime friend, 
Richard Johns, collapsed.  In response, Gottshall administered a 
cold compress which enabled Johns to regain consciousness.  
(..continued) 
 We hold that Conrail's notice of appeal was timely 
filed within the thirty-day appeal period of FRAP 4(a)(4).  Our 
holding here is controlled by Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of 
Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991).  In Osei-Afriyie, we 
held that a notice of appeal was timely when it was filed more 
than thirty days after the judgment date, but within thirty days 
of the district court's dismissal of post-trial motions for lack 
of prosecution under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e).  In this case, 
like Osei-Afriyie, Conrail's notice of appeal was filed more than 
30 days after the judgment date, but within 30 days of the 
district court's dismissal of post-trial motions for lack of 
prosecution under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e).  Therefore, like the 
appeal in Osei-Afriyie, it is timely under FRAP 4(a)(4).   
  
Following this incident, Conrail ordered the men, except Johns, 
back to work.  Five minutes later, Johns again collapsed.  
Gottshall again rushed to assist him and, realizing that his 
friend was having a heart attack, administered CPR.  The 
supervisor tried the radio to call paramedics, but it had been 
taken offline for repair.  By the time help arrived Johns had 
died at Gottshall's side.  The men were then again ordered back 
to work, with Johns' sheet-covered corpse left in view along the 
tracks.  
 The next day, Conrail reprimanded Gottshall for 
administering CPR, and over the days that followed, Conrail 
worked the crew as hard under similar conditions.  Gottshall 
subsequently left work, secluded himself in his basement, and 
spent three weeks in a psychiatric institution where he was 
treated for major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.  
He exhibited suicidal preoccupations, anxiety, insomnia, appetite 
loss, physical weakness, nightmares, and weight loss. 
 We reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for Conrail and remanded for trial.  We reasoned that, 
when considering the totality of the extreme facts, Gottshall's 
claim had sufficient indicia of genuineness of emotional injury 
to be cognizable under FELA, and that genuine issues of material 
fact existed regarding breach of duty, injury, and causation.  
Judge Roth dissented.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and 
determined that the common-law "zone of danger" test is the 
proper standard for evaluating whether a railroad employer has a 
legal duty in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
  
under FELA.  Since that test was different from and narrower than 
this court's test, the Court reversed and remanded for 
reconsideration.  
 B. Carlisle 
 Alan Carlisle began working for Conrail as a train 
dispatcher in 1976.  His job was to ensure timely and safe 
movement of passengers and cargo.  A 1984 reduction in force, 
combined with aging railstock and equipment, increased his job 
stress and responsibility.  Conrail constantly pressured Carlisle 
to achieve on-time performance and instructed him to ignore 
safety concerns that would slow the movement of trains.  In 1988, 
Carlisle additionally became trainmaster in the South 
Philadelphia yards, where he troubleshot trains in dangerous 
areas over erratic hours.  He began to experience insomnia, 
fatigue, headaches, depression, sleep walking, and weight loss.  
After working 12-15 hour days for 15 straight weeks, his stress-
related problems culminated in a nervous breakdown. 
 We affirmed the jury award of $386,500 in damages, 
reasoning that Carlisle's claim had sufficient indicia of 
genuineness of emotional injury and that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that extended exposure to the dangerous and stressful 
working conditions would cause injury.  We therefore upheld his 
FELA claim for negligent infliction of emotional injuries arising 
from work-related stress.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  
In contrast to Gottshall, which resulted in a remand for further 
consideration in light of the newly announced standard, the Court 
in Carlisle not only reversed, but also remanded with 
  
instructions to enter judgment for Conrail, explaining that 
Conrail had no legal duty since Carlisle plainly was not in the 
zone of danger.  
 C. The Zone of Danger Test 
 The Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger test, in 
part, to limit defendants' liability to certain classes of 
plaintiffs and to certain types of harm, notwithstanding that 
some genuine claims would be foreclosed.  Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 
at 2408-09.  In justifying these limitations, the Court wrote: 
 Our FELA cases require that we look to the 
common law when considering the right to 
recover asserted by respondents, and the 
common law restricts recovery for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress on several 
policy grounds:  the potential for a flood of 
trivial suits, the possibility of fraudulent 
claims that are difficult for judges and 
juries to detect, and the specter of 
unlimited and unpredictable liability. 
 
Id. at 2411.  The Court concluded that these policy 
considerations "accord with the concerns that have motivated our 
FELA jurisprudence."  Id.    
 To effectuate these goals, the Court defined the zone 
of danger test as follows:  "The zone of danger test limits 
recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a 
physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, 
or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that 
conduct."  Id. at 2406 (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, using 
different language seemingly in tension with the foregoing, the 
Court later explained:  "Railroad employees thus will be able to 
  
recover for injuries--physical and emotional--caused by the 
negligent conduct of their employers that threatens them 
imminently with physical impact."  Id. at 2411 (emphasis added).  
Thus it is unclear whether the zone of danger test turns (in the 
absence of actual physical impact) on risk of physical impact or 
risk of physical harm. 
 In the course of its opinion, the Court made several 
other pertinent observations.  The Court stated that "[u]nder 
this test, a worker within the zone of danger of physical impact 
will be able to recover for emotional injury caused by fear of 
physical injury to himself, whereas the worker outside the zone 
will not,"  id. at 2410-11 (emphasis added),  However, again 
using different language, the Court later stated that  "[w]e see 
no reason . . . to allow an employer to escape liability for 
emotional injury caused by apprehension of physical impact . . . 
."  Id. at 2411 (emphasis added).  Then, the Court noted that 
"[t]he zone of danger test is consistent with FELA's central 
focus on physical perils,"  id. at 2410, and that "the rule will 
further Congress' goal of alleviating the physical dangers of 
railroading,"  id. at 2411, but this passage fails to clear up 
the confusion.     
 The Court also instructed that the "zone of danger test 
announced today"  should be applied "in light of common-law 
precedent."  Id. at 2411.  Similarly, in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Souter emphasized that we should "develop a federal 
common law of negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the 
evolving common law."  Id. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring).  We 
  
take this as an injunction to look at common-law precedent, state 
and federal, and to build upon it.   
 In sum, Gottshall mandates application of the common-
law zone of danger test to determine whether a railroad employer 
has a legal duty that would enable negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims to be made under FELA.  As we have 
pointed out, the Supreme Court's language is in important 
respects opaque and confusing in that it is unclear whether 
plaintiffs must be placed in immediate risk of physical harm4 or 
whether plaintiffs must be imminently threatened with physical 
impact.5  Although these concerns are not outcome determinative 
                     
4
.  It is also unclear whether the Court would require the 
plaintiff to actually fear physical injury (to himself) as a 
prima facie element (absent physical impact) or would just 
consider fear in determining damages.  While the Court appears to 
have adopted the damages approach (by stating that "a worker in 
the zone of danger of physical impact will be able to recover for 
emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury to himself," 
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2410-11), we note that some common-law 
zone of danger tests include fear as a prima facie element.  See, 
e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa. 1970).  Though 
it does not appear under the facts of this case that Bloom feared 
physical injury to himself, we need not reach the issue, since we 
hold that Bloom fails to otherwise qualify under other aspects of 
the enunciated test. 
 
5
.  Finally, it is also unclear, inter alia, whether by this 
language ("physical impact") the Court would require a 
plaintiff's initial injuries to be physically manifested.  Many 
zone of danger jurisdictions "require that a plaintiff 
demonstrate a 'physical manifestation' of an alleged emotional 
injury, that is, a physical injury or effect that is the direct 
result of the emotional injury, in order to recover."  Gottshall, 
114 S. Ct. at 2407 n.11 (citing Garvis v. Employers Mut. Casualty 
Co., 497 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993)).  However, under Gottshall's 
formulation, it is not clear whether physical manifestation is an 
element.  In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell, 
107 S. Ct. 1410, 1418 & n.22 (1987), the Supreme Court hinted but 
  
here, we hope the Supreme Court will clarify them in its next 
FELA emotional distress case. 
 D. Discussion  
 In applying Gottshall to this case, it is necessary 
that we assess:  (1) whether Bloom sustained a physical impact; 
or (2) whether Bloom was placed in immediate risk of physical 
harm (or alternatively whether Bloom was threatened imminently 
with physical impact). 
 
 
 1. 
 
 Under the zone of danger test announced by the Court in 
Gottshall, Conrail has a legal duty if Bloom sustained a physical 
impact.  Bloom argues that he sustained a physical impact because 
the locomotive engine struck the pedestrian, and he could hear 
the thump.  Bloom further argues any physical impact, no matter 
(..continued) 
failed to decide, whether physical manifestation is required 
under FELA.  Ultimately, we also need not reach this issue 
because, in light of common law precedent, Bloom did demonstrate 
physical manifestation through weight loss, loss of sleep, 
nightmares, vomiting, and diagnosed post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 
(Colo. 1978) (en banc) (nightmares, sleepwalking, nervousness, 
and irritability showed sufficient physical manifestation); 
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656, 657, 660 (Vt. 1967) 
(nervous shock, sleeplessness, weight loss, faintness, and 
trembling showed sufficient physical manifestation); Daley v. 
LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395-96 (Mich. 1970) (weight loss, 
inability to perform household duties, extreme nervousness, and 
irritability are facts from which jury could find physical 
injury); Johnson  v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. 1975) 
(recurrent nightmares, difficulty in concentrating, irritability, 
inability to function properly at work, tenseness, anxiety, and 
psychiatric confirmation of emotional distress showed objective 
manifestations of the injury). 
  
  
how slight, suffices, citing Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 
72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1978), where the plaintiff was negligently 
exposed to potentially lethal tuberculosis.  Plummer, 580 F.2d at 
76.  Conrail counters that Bloom did not sustain a physical 
impact because at all times he safely rode in the locomotive's 
cab, and, while the pedestrian was physically impacted by the 
train, Bloom was not.  We agree. 
 As Conrail submits, Bloom rode safely in the 
locomotive's cab, and the physical impact was between the train 
and the pedestrian.  Even if the "no-matter-how-slight" standard 
applies, Bloom's claim would unavailingly stretch the broadest 
common-law cases.6  Even Stoddard v. Davidson, 513 A.2d 419 (Pa. 
                     
6
.  Under the common law, courts applying the physical impact 
test developed the "no-matter-how-slight" standard to prevent 
sometimes harsh results in near-miss situations.  Thus, physical 
impact was found in some tenuous circumstances.  W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 363-64 (5th ed. 
1988) (" 'Impact' has meant a slight blow, a trifling burn or 
electric shock, a trivial jolt or jar, a forcible seating on the 
floor, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke.") (citations 
omitted); see, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 
737 (Mass. 1902) (slight blow); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. 
v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1929) (trifling burn); 
Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980) (x-rays of pregnant 
woman); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961)  
(jostling of occupants in low-speed car collision); Porter v. 
Delaware, Lackawanna W. R.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust in 
eye); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (smoke 
inhalation).  Other courts applying the physical impact test, 
however, have not extended it so far.  See, e.g., Williams v. 
Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 n.8 (D.C. 1990) ("We use the term 
'impact' in this discussion and throughout the opinion in its 
ordinary use, just as its use has developed under the impact 
rule.  It means a violent physical contact, a striking together, 
a collision.") (citing Webster's New World Dictionary 703 (2d ed. 
1984)).   
     As courts increasingly adopted the zone of danger test, the 
need to stretch the definition of physical impact dissipated. 
Some zone of danger jurisdictions, however, do include the no-
  
Super. Ct. 1986), where it was held that the plaintiff sustained 
a "physical impact" when he was jostled as a result of his motor 
vehicle running over a corpse left in the road, is 
distinguishable in terms of extent of the impact.7  Moreover, 
Plummer is also distinguishable because it is a toxic exposure 
case involving the threat of future physical harm -- not an 
accident case like this one.  So then, Bloom did not sustain a 
physical impact, and hence we turn to the other facets of the 
test. 
 2. 
 Under the zone of danger test announced by the Supreme 
Court in Gottshall, Conrail may have a legal duty to Bloom if he 
was placed in immediate risk of physical harm or if Bloom was 
threatened imminently with physical impact.  Compare Towns v. 
Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1979) (boy on porch of home 
destroyed by explosion and fire who experienced no direct 
physical impact was subjected to "unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm"); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965) 
(woman who lodged car in rut on train track and jumped prior to 
collision but who experienced no direct physical impact was 
(..continued) 
matter-how-slight qualifier in the physical impact prong of the 
zone of danger test.  See Plummer, 580 F.2d at 76 (quoting Kahle 
v. Glosser Bros., 462 F.2d 815, 817 (3d Cir. 1972)).  
Importantly, in Gottshall, the Supreme Court included the no-
matter-how-slight qualifier when defining the physical impact 
test but did not include it when defining the zone of danger 
test.  Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2406.   
7
.  Moreover, the Stoddard panel was seriously divided.  Judge 
Brosky wrote the opinion of the court, Judge Johnson dissented, 
and Judge Lipez concurred in the result without opinion. 
  
"within the immediate zone of physical risk") with Resavage v. 
Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952) (mother who, from porch, watched 
child get hit by car was not subjected to unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) 
(parents who, from a few yards away, watched child get hit by car 
not in "zone of danger of physical impact"); Asaro v. Cardinal 
Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990) (mother who 
sustained emotional injury after child was mistreated at hospital 
was not "threatened with bodily harm").  While Bloom contends 
that he met this test, Conrail counters that Bloom was not placed 
in immediate risk of physical harm because at all times he safely 
rode in the locomotive's cab.  We agree, and conclude Bloom was 
neither placed in immediate risk of physical harm nor threatened 
imminently with physical impact.   
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 In sum, we hold that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in denying Conrail's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law because Bloom's evidence fails to establish any set 
of facts actionable under FELA in light of the zone of danger 
test announced by the Supreme Court in Gottshall.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to 
enter judgment for Conrail.8 
                     
8
.  Bloom contends that if we find insufficient evidence in the 
record to support a finding of physical impact or zone of danger, 
then the appropriate remedy is a new trial because "[a] new trial 
will permit Mr. Bloom to present evidence that was not relevant 
under this Court's decision and that did not become relevant 
until the Gottshall decision was rendered on June 24, 1994."  
  
 
 _____________________________ 
 
(..continued) 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 5 n.4.  But in making this 
argument, Bloom neither proffers nor suggests what new evidence 
is now relevant and would be introduced in light of Gottshall.  
Hence we reject this argument.   
